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The Degree Of Nondisclosed Evidence Sufficiently
Exculpatory To Constitute A Denial
Of Due Process
State v. Giles'
Defendants, convicted of raping a sixteen year old girl,2 were
granted a new trial by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County under
the Post Conviction Procedure Act.3 This decision resulted from a
finding that the prosecution had suppressed and withheld certain
evidence from the defendants in violation of their constitutional right
to due process. The evidence in question was information concerning
an alleged incident of rape4 of the prosecutrix by persons other than
the defendants which occurred after the rape for which defendants were
convicted but prior to their trial; and information concerning an alleged
suicide attempt by the prosecutrix following the alleged rape incident.5
In reversing the granting of post-conviction relief, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that while the suppression or withholding by
the state of material evidence exculpating an accused violates his right
to due process,6 the nondisclosed information in the present case was
neither material to the guilt or punishment imposed nor prejudicial
to the defendants.7 Judge Oppenheimer, joined by Judge Hammond,
1. 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965).
2. Affirmed, Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d 359 (1962), appeal dismissed,
372 U.S. 767 (1963). Subsequent denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence was affirmed on procedural grounds, Giles v. State, 231 Md. 387,
190 A.2d 627 (1963).
3. MD. CODe ANN. art. 27, § 645A (Supp. 1964), discussed in 19 MD. L. Riv. 223(1959) and 24 MD. L. Rxv. 46, 53 (1964).
4. Facts determined at the lower court PCPA hearing indicated that the prose-
cutrix attended a party in another county about five weeks after the incident involving
the defendants. She had intercourse there - allegedly against her will - with two
boys, with one of whom she had had intercourse on previous occasions. She would
have consented to these acts if not fearful that others at the party would also have
wished to participate. Her family, subsequently learning of these incidents, made a
complaint to Montgomery County police, but were told the complaint had to be made
in the county where the acts occurred. Thereupon, her father made a complaint to
the Prince George's County police, who interviewed the prosecutrix in the hospital(see note 5, infra) and were informed that she did not desire to file any complaints
and had not authorized any to be made. She further refused to testify if the complaint
was pursued. With the consent of the girl's father, the interviewing officer then marked
the case closed and unfounded.
In addition to the above evidence, several affidavits filed at the hearing and
executed by acquaintances of the prosecutrix indicated that she was a sexuallypromiscuous girl. It should be noted that the basis of Giles' defense was that the
prosecutrix not only consented but suggested and invited intercourse.
5. On the morning after the party, the prosecutrix was admitted to Prince
George's General Hospital, having taken an overdose of sleeping pills in what was
diagnosed as an attempted suicide, secondary to an "adjustment reaction of adolescence."
The attending psychiatrist testified at the lower court hearing that an attempted
suicide by a teenager was, in his opinion, evidence of mental illness; however, he
stated that an attempted suicide would not permit an opinion as to her mental
condition at the time of the defendants' trial five months later.
6. 239 Md. at 468, 212 A.2d at 107. The court cited Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422,
174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), noted in 23 MD. L. Rtv. 178 (1963).
7. Id. at 474, 212 A.2d at 111.
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filed a strong dissent, taking issue primarily with, the majority's having
"put themselves in the place of the triers of the facts."'  Conceding
that the court-appointed defense counsel knew of prior acts of un-
chastity of the prosecutrix, the dissenting opinion, contended that "the
additional withheld evidence might have made :possible a far more
effective cross-examination than mere knowledge of prior acts of
unchastity of itself permitted."' 9 The dissent further stated:
If information is withheld by the prosecution and if that
information, although not pursued by the prosecution, of itself
would have reasonably led to the procuring of information usable
in any manner in the defense of the accused, that fact of itself
should make the withholding of the uncommunicated matters the
basis for a new trial.10
This case presents two questions for discussion. First, under
what circumstances is the prosecution in a criminal case obligated to
disclose evidence possibly material to the guilt of or the punishment
imposed upon the accused? Second, when is evidence of sufficient
materiality to render its nondisclosure a violation of defendant's right
to due process?
The public prosecutor has been charged with the formidable re-
sponsibility of insuring justice to the accused through a fair and
impartial trial" while exercising his official duty in representing the
state' 2 in a quasi-judicial capacity.3  When the prosecutor becomes
aware of evidence favorable to the accused, either prior to or during
8. Id. at 479, 212 A.2d at 113. Four years before Giles, the Court of Appeals
itself stated: "lit would be 'too dogmatic' for us to say that the jury would
not have attached any significance to this evidence in considering the punishment of
the defendant .... Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 430, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (1961), aff'd,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. Ibid. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), where the Supreme
Court said: "The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or
liberty may depend.
10. Id. at 480, 212 A.2d at 114.
11. Since the common law system of jurisprudence is based upon presentation of
evidence by adversaries, the Supreme Court has found it necessary to pronounce the
principle underlying this delicate balance of dual responsibility as follows:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so .... It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about ajust one. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
12. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) ; Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) ; United States v. Graham, 325 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1963) ; United
States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) ; Wasey v. State, 236 Ind. 215, 138
N.E.2d 1 (1956).
13. State v. Selle, 367 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1963) ; People v. Lombard, 4 App. Div.
2d 666, 168 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1957) ; State v. Rose, 62 Wash. 2d.309, 382 P.2d 513 (1963).
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the trial, the disclosure of such evidence may be required 4 to comply
with his higher obligation,' 5 and the failure to do so may result in a
denial of due process.'" While such duty does not extend to facts
readily available to a diligent defender,' it includes a responsibility
to call witnesses,'" albeit they may not favor his position, and to refrain
from the knowing use of false testimony.'"
The case of Griffin v. United States" has been relied upon to
support the requirement that the prosecution disclose evidence that
"may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense."
The Maryland Court of Appeals in the present Giles case, maintaining
that admissibility and usefulness are not the sole determinants of
suppression sufficient to constitute a denial of due process,2' has added
the requirement that such evidence must be "exculpatory," i.e.,
"material and capable of clearing or tending to clear the accused of
guilt or of substantially affecting the punishment to be imposed."22
The leading Maryland case prior to Giles was Brady v. State,2"
where, in a felony-murder prosecution, the state's attorney had failed
14. See infra for further discussion of this requirement. The leading cases in
Maryland are Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aft'd, 373 U.S. 83(1963) and Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964),
noted in 25 MD. L. RZv. 79 (1965). Cases in other jurisdictions include United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875(1955); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 33 A.L.R.2d 1407(3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953) ; Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d
990 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ; Thomas v.
United States, 343 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United States ex rel. Montgomery v.
Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) ; People v. Tann, 326 Mich. 361, 40 N.W.2d
184 (1949); People v. Parks, 20 App. Div. 2d 907, 249 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1964). For
further analysis, see Note, The Duty of Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence,
60 COLUM. L. Rtv. 858 (1960).
15. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) ; Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935) ; People v. Carr, 163 Cal. App. 2d 568, 329 P.2d 746 (1958).
16. Where such denial is so found, conviction must be reserved. Barbee v.
Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221
F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) ; Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422,
174 A.2d 167 (1961), aft'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1421 et seq.
(1953).
17. United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962) ; In re Lessard, 62 Cal.
2d 516, 42 Cal. Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39 (1965) ; In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6 (1963), reh. on other grounds, 61 Cal. 2d 556, 39 Cal. Rptr. 375,
393 P.2d 687 (1964).
18. See 60 COLUM. L. Rev., supra note 14, at 865-68.
19. Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959) ; Hall v. Warden, 222
Md. 590, 158 A.2d 316 (1960). See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), where
the Supreme Court said, "[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of
false evidence known to be such by representatives of the state, must fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment." See also Annot., 2 L. ed. 2d 1575 (1958).
20. 183 F.2d 990, at 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Newly discovered evidence of an
uncommunicated threat of deceased, known to the prosecution prior to trial but undis-
closed to the defendant, was held sufficiently material on the issue of self-defense to
require granting of a new trial.
21. 239 Md. at 471, 212 A.2d at 107.
22. Id. at 471-72 and 108. The court accepted the definition of "exculpatory"
pronounced in Dean v. State, 381 P.2d 178 (Okla. Crim. 1963). In support of this
requirement, the court cited State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 244, 365 P.2d 668, 669 (1961),
which stated that deliberately suppressed evidence "constitutes a denial of due process
of law if such evidence is material to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to the
penalty to be imposed."
23. 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). There, the prose-
cution had knowledge of the nondisclosed evidence but thought it to be inadmissible.
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to inform defense counsel of the existence of the confession of de-
fendant's accomplice to the effect that the accomplice had actually
committed the homicide. The court in Giles supported its new require-
ment by holding the Brady evidence to have been exculpatory on the
issue of either guilt or punishment. The court also cited Barbee v.
Warden24 as adhering to the Griffin test and additionally involving
exculpatory evidence. There, the nondisclosed evidence was a police
ballistics report that the gun found in the car of defendant accused
of the murder of a police officer, and described by witnesses as similar
to the one carried by defendant at the time of the shooting, was not
the gun used to kill the officer. In essence, the requirement that the
prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence 5 not available to the defendant
is now definitive law; yet, the critical question remains - when are
these nondisclosed facts considered exculpatory?26
In cases where the prosecutor is aware that a testifying witness is
guilty of perjury and such testimony is relevant to the guilt or punish-
ment of defendant, such information is certainly exculpatory" and
must be corrected by the prosecution.2" If the testimony, while not false,
leaves the jury with an inaccurate picture and the prosecutor has
information unavailable to the defendant, he is obligated to correct
such distortion where it affects the guilt29 or punishment"° of defendant.
A leading case is United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,"' where,
after defendant was convicted of first degree murder, his counsel learned
24. 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). In this case there was doubt as to the prose-
cutor's knowledge of nondisclosed evidence; however, the United States Court of
Appeals pointed out, at 846, "[T]he police are also part of the prosecution, and the
taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of
a nondisclosure." Thus, in the Giles case, the court, after quoting Barbee, concluded,
239 Md. at 470, 212 A.2d at 108: "It would not be unreasonable therefore to charge
the prosecutor and his agents . . . with knowledge of all seemingly pertinent facts
related to the charge which are known to the police department who represent the
local subdivision that has jurisdiction to try the case."
25. The court pointed out that where doubt exists as to what is admissible and
useful to exculpate defendant, the trial court should determine whether a duty to
disclose exists. 239 Md. at 471, 212 A.2d at 109.
26. It is upon this question that Judge Oppenheimer took issue with the majority,
note 9 supra and accompanying text.
27. Strosnider v. Warden, 228 Md. 663, 666-67, 180 A.2d 854, 856 (1962) ; see
also note 19 supra.
28. Hall v. Warden, 222 Md. 590, 158 A.2d 316 (1960). It should be noted that
the duty to disclose false testimony is not a duty peculiar to a prosecutor but rather
a duty of every attorney. In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951) ; In re Gladstone,
185 App. Div. 471, 173 N.Y.S. 89 (1918) ; In re Abuza, 178 App. Div. 757, 166 N.Y.S.
105 (1917); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095 (1958). Also see ABA:
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL & JUDICIAL E'nics, Canons 29 & 41 (1957).
29. See, e.g., Turner v. Ward, 321 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963), where in a rape
prosecution, the state's attorney allowed the doctor who had examined the victim to
testify in such a manner as to leave the jury with the impression that rape had been
committed, which he knew was contrary to the doctor's opinion, and withheld the
physician's opinion that sodomy had been committed on the victim.
30. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), where a husband accused of
his wife's murder claimed that the killing occurred in a fit of passion on discover-
ing his wife kissing a man in a parked car late at night. At the trial, the man's
testimony gave the jury the false impression that his relationship with deceased was
merely casual, when prosecutor had been told by him that he had had illicit intercourse
with victim. The Supreme Court held this omission was seriously prejudicial, since
acceptance of the defense by the jury would have precluded an offense punishable
by death.
31. 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
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of a report by a police officer indicating that the defendant had been
intoxicated and in a quarrelsome mood at the time of arrest.3 2 The
prosecutor knew of the officer's willingness to testify to this but instead
called other officers, directing his questions in such a manner as to
exclude this information. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
that this practice of the prosecution resulted in a suppression of vital
evidence material to the accused's guilt and punishment, i.e., exculpa-
tory evidence, constituting a denial of due process.3 3
The general problem of impeaching the credibility of witnesses,
particularly those whose testimony is essential to the prosecution's case,
clearly has relevance to the issue of non-disclosure. If the state's
attorney prior to trial knows that qualified physicians employed by his
office to examine the defendant, the victim or witnesses, believe such
persons are legally incompetent, and he has failed to inform the
defense or the court of such opinions, he has clearly breached his
duty and denied the accused his right to due process.3 4
Among other pertinent items of information which are admissible
to attack credibility and which may carry an obligation of disclosure
where exculpatory are the possible insanity of the witness,3 5 his prior
confinement in a mental hospital,3 6 or prior inconsistent statements. 
7
A further extension of this obligation may include information that the
prosecution's witnesses have made an agreement to receive lenient
treatment in return for testifying against defendants. Usually such
points are elicited on cross-examination; however, when the witness
denies any prior promises of leniency, the prosecution must correct this
testimony, if known by him to be untrue, as it is material to the
credibility of such a witness.3 8
Where the knowing use of false testimony is present, there is a
tendency not to require any showing of prejudice resulting from the
acts of prosecution.3 9 In cases which involve a passive nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence, one must show some degree of conduct so
offensive to our traditional sense of justice that it fails to achieve the
minimum requisites of a fair trial.40 This requirement is said to vary
inversely with the gravity of the act of omission in the conduct of the
trial. 41
32. It should be noted that the effect of the nondisclosed evidence, if accepted by
the jury, would have precluded the necessary intent for first degree murder.
33. 221 F.2d at 768. Judge Hastie, in a concurring opinion, pointed out that
questions of fundamental fairness depend so much on the facts of the particular case
that a precise rule cannot be devised. Id. at 769.
34. Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
35. Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.), reh., 293 F.2d 605 (1961).
36. Walley v. State, 240 Miss. 136, 126 So. 2d 534 (1961).
37. Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.), reh., 293 F.2d 605 (1961).
38. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), quoted in notes 9 & 19 supra; People
v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956).
39. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1964).
40. "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defin-
ing, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that
convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a 'sense of justice'."
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
41. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961).
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A discussion of the necessity of disclosure is incomplete without
the practical realization that the discovery by the defendants of such
exculpatory evidence is a prerequisite to any subsequent claim of
denial of due process. Perhaps the most acute situations involving this
problem of discovery are exemplified by the distinction between the
introduction of a gun purported to be defendant's and to have been
used in the killing, where the ballistics report is negative,42 and those
circumstances where the prosecutor, realizing the nature of the report
is damaging to his case, withholds mention of the gun altogether.4 3
Certainly, the probability of the defense discovering such exculpatory
information in the latter case is quite remote. The existence of tangible
evidence found by police at the scene of the crime, which would tend
to exculpate defendant," or of disinterested witnesses who claim to
have seen either no one or persons other than defendant at the scene
of the crime, must be disclosed to the defense prior to or during the
trial, if the prosecutor has reason to believe their existence would
otherwise be unknown.45 The destruction of4" or the refusal to pro-
duce47 evidence material to the defendant's guilt or punishment has
also been held sufficient to reverse a conviction.
It would appear then that the answer to the second question posed
above - when is evidence sufficiently material to render its non-
disclosure prejudicial - rests largely with the discretion of the
court;4 this is well demonstrated by the majority and dissenting
42. This is the fact situation of the Barbee case, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
43. In United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 33 A.L.R.2d 1407(3d Cir. 1952), defendant and two companions were convicted of the felony-murder
death of a policeman during the robbery of a supermarket. At the trial of an accom-
plice, subsequent to the defendant's trial, information tending to show another police-
man had fired the fatal shot, with a confirming ballistics report, was introduced. Theprosecution in the defendant's trial had known of this information but failed to call
witnesses to support that theory. The Court of Appeals held this to be reversible
error as a suppression of evidence denying due process, since it was vital to the issue
of punishment.
44. People v. Hoffman, 32 Ill. 2d 96, 203 N.E.2d 873 (1965). Cf., in regard
to the use of illegally seized evidence by the prosecution, the discussion in Fahy v.Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (swastika-painting violation) and United States
ex rel. Holloway v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D. Conn. 1964) (narcotics violation).
45. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Applica-
tion of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
46. Curran v. State of Del., 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
948 (1959).
47. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961). Another problem in-
volving refusal is the delicate question of the informer privilege. For discussion, see
White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811, 813-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855(1964), where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1947), as laying down the rule that the government may not refuse
to disclose the identity of an informer instrumental in the apprehension of a defendant
charged with a narcotics violation on the grounds that the information is privileged.
In conjunction with Roviaro, they also cited United States v. Clark, 220 F. Supp. 905(E.D. Pa. 1963), as holding that the government's inability to produce at the trial
an informer and eye-witness to the charged crime constitutes a denial of due process
as a suppression of material evidence, unless it is demonstrated that reasonably
sufficient efforts by the prosecution to secure such informer's presence proved fruitless.
For recent elaboration see, Note, The Present Extent of the Informer Privilege, 25
MD. L. R v. 57 (1965).
48. Note Judge Hastie's opinion in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221
F.2d 763, 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
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opinions in the main case.49 Some guidelines can be stated nonethe-
less. Items such as fingerprints, bloodstains and scientific reports, while
not always clearly admissible, can be invaluable in showing innocence
or guilt and may be vital for impeachment purposes.5 Because of the
great probative value of such tests, they should be freely discoverable,5 '
and the withholding of such information generally will be construed as
a denial of due process. In instances where the nondisclosed evidence
is less clearly exculpatory, however, the defendant must essentially
rely on the basic integrity of the prosecutor, coupled with the possibility
of reversal for any resulting unjust conviction, to assure the prosecutor's
compliance with his duty of disclosure. The courts in these instances
appear less willing to overturn convictions.
In the principal case, the court rejected the allegation that the
attempted suicide demonstrated any incompetency of the prosecutrix as
a witness, or that it could be used for purposes of impeaching her
credibility.2 The appellees also contended that the nondisclosed in-
cidents showed the prosecutrix to have been afflicted with nymphomania
- a type of mental illness. The court conceded that evidence of
nymphomania was admissible on the issue of credibility53 but refused
to accept an inference of such condition on the facts presented in the
record. The rule established in the principal case requires that the
withheld evidence must be: (1) material to the defense (Brady test)
(2) capable of clearing or tending to clear the defendant (Barbee test);
and (3) admissible and useful to the defense (Griffin test). By fusing
these separately enunciated requirements into one all-encompassing
test, the Court of Appeals has made any of the alternative single tests
insufficient and has imposed a heavy burden on the defendant adversely
affected by the wrongful suppression of evidence.
However, even if this new rule of law is not considered intolerable,
it is arguable that the court deprive the defendants here of their right
to due process. While the nondisclosed information is inadmissible
under the present rule excluding specific acts of misconduct to establish
lack of chastity, it would have been useful in cross-examination and, as
the dissent argued, perhaps admissible when viewed within the context
49. The lower court, in granting the PCPA relief, had relied on Smallwood v.
Warden, 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962), where, like Giles, the defense to a rape
indictment was consent. It appears that the physician who examined the complaining
witness in this case had told the prosecution of her repeated acts which he char-
acterized as leading her into trouble sooner or later; however, this physician was not
called upon to testify. The District Court held that the failure of the state's attorney
to disclose information as to the history, physical condition, and reputation of prose-
cutrix, together with inadequate representation of counsel, was sufficient to vitiate
the conviction.
The Giles court distinguished Smallwood as being a nondisclosure of evidence
likely to affect the result of the trial, 239 Md. at 473, 212 A.2d at 110, while they con-
cluded in Giles that the withheld information would not likely have affected the result.
50. Note Judge Oppenheimer's dissent in Giles, 239 Md. 458, 475, 212 A.2d 101,
111-14.
51. See Note, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 42 NEB. L. Rev. 127, 131-32
(1962).
52. 239 Md. at 472, 212 A.2d at 109. The dissent, however, maintained that such
information might well have cast doubt on the credibility of the witness.
53. Id. at 474, 212 A.2d at 110-11. The court cited in support thereof People
v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951). See also 3 WIGMORt, EVIDFNCt
§ 934(a) (3d ed. 1940).
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of the case. 4 Furthermore, the information was certainly material
to the witness's credibility.55 But the majority, placing themselves
in the position of the triers of the facts, speculated that the jury would
have attached little significance to the withheld evidence. Under the
circumstances, this would appear to have been an incorrect basis of
decision."O*
Unlocking The Lockout
American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB1
On June 6, 1961, collective bargaining began between the
American Ship Building Company and eight unions, but the employ-
ment contract expiration date, August 1, was reached with agreement
still not in sight. The unions proposed that the existing contract be
extended six months or in the alternative that it be extended indefinitely
with terms of the new contract to be retroactive to August 1. Under
either proposal, the unions would have had the prerogative of striking
at whatever time appeared most damaging to the company, while
still working under the security of the provisions of the old contract.
The nature of the employer's business in this case made the unions'
proposals particularly unacceptable. The American Ship Building
Company is engaged in the repair of Great Lakes vessels and operates
its yards at peak capacity during the winter months, when shipping
54. Id. at 479, 212 A.2d at 113. See also 3 WIGMORn, op. cit. supra note 53,
§ 979, at 537 (3d ed. 1940), which concludes:
There is however one situation in which an exception should be recognized, in
spite of these reasons of policy, viz., where the witness is a woman-complainant
on a charge of sex-offense. To ascertain such a witness's veracity without an
inquiry into her life-history is psychologically impossible, for her testimonial
trustworthiness is often linked inseparably with her other traits. These cannot
be ascertained without considering specific acts of her past behavior.
55. Ibid. See also note 10 supra. The dissent cited 3 WIGMoRr, op. cit. supra
note 53, § 934(a) (3d ed. 1940) :
Occasionally is found in women complainants, testifying to sex-offences by
men, a dangerous form of abnormal mentality - dangerous here, because it affects
testimonial trustworthiness while not affecting other mental operations. It con-
sists in a disposition to fabricate irresponsibly charges of sex-offences against
persons totally innocent. . . . Sometimes it is associated with unchaste conduct
in the witness, sometimes not. But its nature is well known to psychiatrists and
is recognizable by them. Testimony to its existence in an individual should always
be receivable.
56. See notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
* EDITOR's No'rt: Certiorari has been granted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
34 U.S.L. W4EK 3317 (March 22, 1966).
1. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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